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Johan van der Walt* 
Prelude 
Ladies and gentlemen, about what am I actually speaking, when I talk from this direction and in this 
direction about the poem? 
    
... the poem would thus be the place, where all tropes and metaphors want to be taken into the absurd. 
 
Topos research? Surely. But in the light of that which must be researched. In view of the u-topos. 
 
*** 
Meine Damen und Herren, wovon spreche ich denn eigentlich, wenn ich aus dieser Richtung, in dieser 
Richtung ... von dem Gedicht spreche? 
    
... das Gedicht wäre somit der Ort, wo alle Tropen und Metaphern ad absurdum geführt werden wollen. 
 





We begin with the prelude above because of Celan’s invocation of the word “U-topie” in 
the last line. We do so because Celan’s invocation of the word “U-topie” in this line 
reflects the fundamental transformation of the utopian imagination in the course of the 
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twentieth century. This transformation became abundantly evident in certain prominent 
trends in twentieth century philosophical thinking. Philosophy’s role in this 
transformation was probably as performative as it was constative. Philosophy or at least 
some philosophy reflected or registered this transformation clearly but in doing so also 
contributed to it. The transformation of the utopian imagination was, however, not just 
the work of philosophers. It was also reflected in and effected by artistic and literary 
intuitions. Celan’s lines cited above, the reflection of a poet on poetry, was surely an 
eminent case in point. 
 
The trend of philosophical, artistic and literary thinking at issue here can be described, 
very broadly, in terms of a resistance to the way language and the exigencies of clear 
communication reduce the utterly incomparable uniqueness of singular entities or 
persons or events to repeatable and generic instances of fixed identity and stable 
meaning. At issue in this trend is what one might call, following Theodor Adorno, a 
negative-linguistic quest for the non-identity of singular existence that transcends or 
exceeds the identity-forging thrust of conceptual language. This negative-linguistic quest 
is utopian because of the way it contemplates the possibility of the impossible, as Jacques 
Derrida put it when he received the Adorno prize in 2001.2 It contemplates completely 
non-instrumental relations between individuals that would not subject anyone to the 
systematic instrumentalisation at work in all generalising conceptual schemes.  
 
The law, insisted Adorno, lies at the far end of this identity-forging thrust of conceptual 
language. According to him the law is evidently a kind of hyper conceptual language, the 
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extreme generic thrust of which ignores and suppresses the non-identity and irreducible 
otherness of singular existence. The quest for non-identity that is at issue in the thinking 
that Adorno called “negative dialectics” thus constitutes an endeavour to move as far 
away from the identity-forging quest of law and of all language that rests content with 
generic or generalising predication. Negative dialectics and the law thus move in opposite 
directions and it is exactly these opposite directions or trajectories of language, that Celan 
appears to contemplate with the invocation of two directions - from this direction and in 
this direction (aus dieser Richtung, in dieser Richtung). Section IV (The utopian response 
to the event) will return to Celan to elaborate this point further. 
 
Why does one refer to the transformation of the utopian imagination in the philosophical, 
artistic and literary movements that have been announced here? In what way did 
philosophers like Adorno and poets like Celan change the utopian imagination? What 
was the utopian imagination like before twentieth century philosophy and poetry and art 
changed it? The utopian imagination began with Plato and endured for many centuries – 
in the thoughts of thinkers such as St. Francis, More, Rousseau and Marx – as a very 
topical and typical denunciation of private property. It typically viewed private property 
as the source of all social injustice and all forms of societal alienation. The utopian 
imagination thus became a very predictable and generic socialist resistance against the 
institution of private property before it turned, already to some extent in the work of 
Marx and then very evidently in the work of Adorno and other neo-Marxists, into a much 
more radical questioning of linguistic or conceptual propriety as such. This radical 
questioning of linguistic propriety – what Celan describes in the lines quoted above as the 
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wish of language itself to turn around and away from its regular quest for meaning so as 
to reach back into the absurd – was, however, surely not just a Marxist or neo-Marxist 
development. It reflected a broader movement in twentieth century thinking that was also 
clearly evident in the strands of twentieth century philosophical thinking that became 
known as phenomenology, post-structuralism and deconstruction. And, as already 
mentioned above, it was also clearly discernable in prominent literary and artistic 
sensibilities of the twentieth century. Section II of this essay (The transformation of the 
Utopian Imagination) will trace this development from Plato to Foucault (and Artaud) 
and ultimately to the Italian novelist Italo Calvino. 
 
Italo Calvino’s novel If on a winter’s night a traveller is brought into the discussion of 
the transformation of utopian thought that follows because of the way it clarifies, along 
with Celan’s invocation of the “absurd”, what was ultimately at stake in this 
transformation. A utopian imagination that resists linguistic and conceptual propriety as 
such disqualifies itself logically from just pursuing an alternative conception of 
normative propriety. It can no longer entertain an alternative social vision that is more 
proper than ones that are currently deemed proper or improper. It cannot even 
contemplate the notion of non-alienated social relationships that are more proper to 
human existence than the societal alienation that results from private property 
relationships. At issue in this utopian imagination has to be something that can in no way 
be called “proper” or “more proper”. This is why the notion of the event entered and 
changed the utopian imagination and why it still signals a core element of utopian 
thinking today. This is how the utopian imagination became radically non-normative. It 
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turned into a quest for any occurrence that disrupts propriety in every possible sense of 
the word. And it neither sought nor offered any justification for this quest. Silently but 
evidently, its concern with the event was simply assumed to resist the identities that 
social construction imposed on existence. “Madness beyond insanity”, Foucault calls it. 
Celan, we saw, makes mention of the “absurd”. Calvino, we shall see, calls it “an 
upheaval that still has no name [and] has not yet taken shape”. Following what one might 
loosely call the tradition of phenomenological thinking, I will rely on the notion of the 
“event” to denote this “upheaval with no name”, this “absurdity” and this “madness”. 
 
However, the understanding of the event that will be elaborated in this essay will not be 
confined to the currency it received in the utopian imagination. In fact, it may well be the 
unwonted epistemological merit of the utopian imagination to have drawn social 
scientific attention to a concept that can be used as an analytical point of departure from 
where not only the utopian but also the non-utopian imagination can be described 
instructively. This is what will be done in this essay. Informed by a phenomenological 
concern with the event, the absurd appearance or emergence of singular existence, and 
informed by Celan’s prompt in the lines above, this essay will describe the relation 
between law and the utopian imagination in terms of an inception of two trajectories of 
responsibility. These two trajectories of responsibility, the legal and the utopian, take 
leave of one another from the moment that they emerge from the event that catapults both 
of them into existence. The utopian imagination does therefore not have an exclusive 
claim or relation to the event. The law too is fundamentally related to the event. The law 
is also a response to the event, albeit a very different response. 
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In other words, legal and utopian thinking have a common point of departure, departing 
from which they move in opposite directions. The relation between law and the utopian 
imagination can thus be described in terms of a non-overlapping contiguity. They touch 
one another, or may have touched one another once, for reasons of emerging from or 
having emerged from a common point of departure. But they then take leave and let go of 
one another, or have done so, for the sake of pursuing two different responsibilities or 
two different responses. Responses to what, may one well ask. Law and utopian thinking, 
phenomenology suggests, are two responses to the event from which they emerge. They 
are two modes of responsibility that emerge from and respond to a primordial event or 
happening. But they respond to the event from which they emerge in two very different 
ways. 
 
It might help to contemplate here the picture of two wrist-locked trapeze artists flung into 
space from an origin of which they will henceforth only have a vague and ever vaguer 
memory. The relationship between them commences the moment their wrists unlock (all 
pluralities and all relationships can be said to commence with the “unlocking of wrists”). 
The relationship between law and the utopian imagination commences the moment they 
take leave of one another so as to summersault into two different trajectories. And the 
breath-taking questions will of course always be whether, when and how they might ever 
touch or be in touch again. Can they remain in some kind of orbit, perhaps orbiting 
around one another, sometimes coming closer, sometimes moving far apart, or must they 
simply move on and move off in completely different directions, ultimately becoming 
indifferent to and oblivious of one another? 
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It is along the lines drawn above that this paper will scrutinise the relationship between 
law and utopian thinking and the different trajectories that they must maintain should 
they seek to sustain some significant relationship between them. It will proceed to do so 
as follows. After the discussion of the transformation of European thinking in Section II, 
Section III will explain what is meant by the notion of the primordial event from which 
law and utopian thinking emerge and commence with their divergent trajectories. Section 
IV and V will look at the respective trajectories of utopian thinking, on the one hand, and 
legal thinking, on the other. Section VI thereafter explores the way in which the two 
trajectories of law and the utopian imagination can be considered to relate to one another. 
It does so by invoking the notion of a Stoic difference regarding the different trajectories 
of law and utopian thinking. Stoic difference concerns the way the different and divergent 
trajectories of law and the utopian imagination can be understood as a differential 
relationship that results from two different responses to significant events. The different 
trajectories of law and utopian thinking need not render them indifferent to one another. 
But the return of renewed wrist-locked continuities between legal and utopian discourses 
is no longer to be hoped for. The time for that kind of utopian thinking is over, at least in 
modern and postmodern societies that may wish to lay claim to the acrobatic act called 
liberal democracy. This act turns on the sustenance of an essential distance and difference 
between law and the utopian imagination. 
  
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION 
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The utopian imagination evident in More’s Utopia is typical of renaissance humanism. 
More was a close friend of Erasmus, one of the most prominent humanists of the time, 
and Utopia is significantly influenced by core ideas of Erasmus. Crucial among these 
ideas were the identification and denunciation of private property as the source of most 
social ills. Erasmus’ Adagiorum chiliades commences with two adages that he attributes 
to Pythagoras: “Friends have everything in common” and “friendship is equality”. At 
issue in the text is a discussion of Plato’s communist portrayal of the ideal society. The 
best kind of city and the finest laws, suggests Plato, are to be found where the 
Pythagorean adages are maintained throughout the city.3 
 
The identification and denunciation of private property were, however, not the only and 
most likely not the most pervasive features of renaissance humanism. Renaissance 
humanism, at least as far as the history of legal theory is concerned, was pervasively 
informed by readings of the Stoic philosophers. And the teachings of the Stoic 
philosophers, and the broad legacy of these teachings in Renaissance and later Western 
legal thought, hardly require a denunciation of private property. They may well be 
understood to have sustained, quite to the contrary, the institution of private property.4 
The difference between the utopian and the legal response to the event announced above 
can therefore be said to have found an early or prototype expression in the difference 
between a Platonic/Humanist denunciation of private property and the Stoic acceptance 
of the way private property appears to have become an inevitable social arrangement. 
One already notices here, in these two responses to property in Renaissance humanism, 
the emergence of the two opposite trajectories of law and utopian thinking.   
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A central feature of the Stoicism that Renaissance legal thinking rediscovered was the 
belief in a conception of universal human reasonableness that can be articulated 
positively and, at least ideally, positively embodied in personal ethics and social 
institutions. The rational school of natural law thinking of the seventeenth century 
(Vernunftrecht) can be traced directly to these Stoic roots.5 This humanist conception of 
reason as an intrinsic characteristic of human existence was pervasive during the 
sixteenth century. Influenced as it was by Stoicism, it was quite expectedly also markedly 
a-political and a-historical. Stoicism was from its very beginnings onwards an ethical or 
moral response to the pervasive political disempowerment of Greek citizens under the 
centralised imperial reign of Alexander. No longer able to take part freely in a political 
community that was sufficiently local to allow and require active participation in the life 
of the city, the Stoics sought and found existential meaning in a personal ethics and inner 
morality that turned on the idea of the natural rationality shared by all of humanity.6 The 
idea of moral universalism, the origin of which Alain Badiou would attribute to St. Paul,7 
was already significantly present among the Stoics and it is plausible to accept that the 
Pauline universalism of early Christianity was a derivative of Stoic universalism.8 Moral 
universalism, however, is not a key element of the utopian response to the event that we 
are tracing. In fact, the moral universalism of the Stoics is in a fundamental way non-
utopian. As will be come clear in the next section, and partly already in the next 
paragraph, the Stoic concern with moral universalism is much more characteristic of 
law’s response to the event. It is characteristic of the decidedly non-utopian trajectory of 
the legal response to the event.  
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Pauline Christianity inherited a second characteristic from Stoic thinking. Alongside the 
moral universalism that it preached, Stoic thinking famously also contemplated and 
practised a dispassionate regard for the obvious imperfections of the human being. It 
understood that the very universalism that it contemplated was subject or exposed to 
these imperfections. The Stoics observed that universal rationality and reasonableness 
were constantly threatened and tarnished by human irrationality and unreasonableness. 
Their response to this constant standoff between the reasonable and the unreasonable was 
not to pursue the final triumph of the former over the latter. Their response to this 
standoff consisted in cultivating a dispassionate way of life that would ultimately contain 
instead of aggravate the threat that human imperfection posed to the moral universe to 
which all humans belonged. This dispassionate response had two sides, a personal or 
private and a public side. The personal side consisted in cultivating an inner calm that 
would not be upset by the unreasonable behaviour of others.9 The public side consisted, 
ultimately, in the articulation of a rational system of law that would prevent human 
imperfection and irrationality from ruining the minimum standards of rationality without 
which no human co-existence and commerce would remain possible. 
 
Roman law was in fundamental respects a legacy of the Stoic concern with the minimum 
standards of reasonable sociability that sustain communal life. There was clearly a good 
measure of Aristotle in the mix of ideas that went into Roman law, but to the extent that 
the Aristotelian elements in Roman law comprised concerns that were not already 
assimilated by Stoicism (thus passing through Stoicism to Roman law), they were surely 
 11 
not more utopian than the Stoic influences on Roman law. We shall return to the Stoicism 
embodied in Roman law and in law as such in Section VI. Suffice it now to make one last 
observation regarding the universalistic ethics and morality of the Stoics on which 
Roman law turned before we return to the trajectory of utopian thinking. This 
universalistic morality should not be confused with that which contemporary positivist 
theories of law may want to describe as a conflation of law and morality. Roman law 
maintained a tangible distinction and difference between law and morality.10 But it did 
turn on basic principles of universal reasonableness. As such it did turn on something 
akin to that which Hart described as the “minimum content of natural law” without which 
law can hardly survive as law.11 That this conception of a minimum content of morality or 
natural law hardly confronts one with a utopian response to the event surely requires no 
further contestation. 
 
The Stoicism that informed early Christian thinking received eminent expression in St. 
Paul’s instruction – in Romans 13 – to the Christian community in Rome to respect and 
abide the laws of the emperor. Earthly rulers were ultimately appointed by God. This was 
the beginning of a line of Christian political and legal thought that would become central 
in the work of St. Augustine and would ultimately inform Luther’s denunciation of the 
peasant revolts of 1525.12 Giorgio Agamben recently rearticulated this line of thinking in 
a brilliant reading of St. Paul to which we shall return presently. This line of thinking 
brought to the fore the Christian idea of two relatively separate spheres of existence, the 
earthly and the heavenly. St. Augustine articulated this idea in Books 18-20 of his major 
work De Civitate Dei in terms of the reign of two cities, the City of God and the earthly 
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city. In doing so, he bequeathed a form or mode of political thinking to European 
political thought that is crucial for any attempt to come to terms with the European 
tradition of utopian thinking and, more specifically, with the trajectory of the utopian 
response to the event that has been introduced above as the core theme of this essay. The 
crucial conception at issue here concerns the idea of history or History. Books 18 to 20 of 
De Civitate Dei relate the relation between the heavenly and earthly city in terms of a 
grand historical narrative. They relate St. Augustine’s vision of history as the unfolding 
of God’s eternal plan. The history of the world concerns the part of the plan in which the 
heavenly and earthly cities exist alongside one another in a constant state of conflict and 
tension. This phase of the plan, however, only prepares the way for the full revelation of 
God’s glory and the final triumph of the heavenly over the worldly city at the end of time 
and history.13 
 
Karl Löwith and Jacob Taubes observed more than half a century ago that the great 
modern philosophies of history of Hegel and Marx were secularised re-articulations of 
Augustine’s grand Christian narrative.14 Their observations in this regard surely qualify 
Koselleck’s understanding of history as a discovery of the modern age.15 The idea of 
linear history, as something qualitatively different from ancient chronicles that turned on 
cyclical or seasonal conceptions of time, surely already raises its head with Judeo-
Christian Messianic expectations regarding a future king that would come to liberate 
and/or redeem the faithful from the woes of earthly existence. And St. Augustine’s De 
Civitate Dei can surely be understood as the first grand philosophical and/or ontological 
articulation of this idea in European and Western political thought. Our present concern 
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with the trajectory of the utopian response to the event requires that one takes a closer 
look at especially the Christian idea of history, for there is an ambivalence in this idea of 
history that is crucial for the understanding of the difference between utopian and legal 
thought. This ambivalence would surface in the significant difference between the 
Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history that would emerge from this Christian 
conception of history. The Hegelian narrative would sustain a Stoic element of Christian 
thinking that the orthodox Marxist narrative would abandon in no uncertain terms. 
 
As already mentioned, St. Augustine justified the authority of earthly law and earthly 
rulers with reference to St. Paul’s instruction to the Christian community to abide the 
laws of the secular sovereign. St. Augustine integrated the authority of secular law in 
God’s overall scheme of the world on the basis of this instruction. God’s greater wisdom 
ordained that the complete revelation of his glory first pass through a phase of partial and 
imperfect revelation, and this phase of imperfect revelation necessitated the institutions of 
earthly authority and earthly law.16 A thorough engagement with St. Augustine’s oeuvre 
is not possible here. Suffice it therefore, for purposes of highlighting what one might 
venture to call an essential Stoic element in Christian thought, to rely briefly in what 
follows only on the instructive reading of St. Paul that Agamben articulates in The Time 
that Remains.17 St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, argues Agamben, concerns an instruction 
how to live in the time that remains until the return of the Messiah and the final 
revelation of God’s will and justice. St. Paul instructs the Christian community to respect 
the law, but also to live under the law as if not (ὡς μὴ) under the law. The messianic time 
in which the Christian community lives, pivots on this as if not experience. At issue in 
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this as if not experience of messianic time is not only a faithful refusal to identify earthly 
life with the fullness of God’s glory, but also a resigned equanimity regarding the 
imperfections and evident injustices that prevail in this interim phase of God’s ultimate 
plan.18 This resigned equanimity of the faithful vis-à-vis earthly imperfection can be 
highlighted as the crucial Stoic element in Christian thinking. The Stoics also had to 
come to terms with the evident contradiction that permeated their thinking. They had to 
reconcile their faith in the existence of natural reason in which all humans shared with the 
undeniable irrationality and failures of natural reason that often prevail in human affairs 
and consequently require regulation by coercive law. 
 
The ambiguity regarding the possibility of earthly perfection evident in Stoic and 
Christian political thinking surely renders both these traditions of political thought 
significantly non-utopian or at least incompletely utopian. Both these traditions of 
political thought contained some “utopian” elements. Both entertained counter-factual 
notions (the redeemed Christian community, on the one hand, and the rational 
brotherhood of mankind, on the other). But they reconciled these “utopian” elements with 
the plain evidence of their imperfect realisation on earth. It is important to note, however, 
that certain trends in Christian thinking did at times edge closer to a full or fuller utopian 
imagination, especially when one takes the denunciation of the institution of private 
property as a key element of this imagination. Especially of note in this regard is the 
insistence of the followers of St. Francis that they never owned property. According to 
the Franciscans, they only used and consumed the clothes they wore and the food they 
ate. They never owned any of these goods that they used and consumed. For a while the 
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argument received papal protection under the Exiit qui seminat bull published by Pope 
Nicholas III in 1279, but it became increasingly exposed to critical refutation as the 
Franciscans became a powerful force in Catholicism that eventually controlled vast 
material resources. Especially Dominicans began to point out the hypocrisy evident in the 
Franciscan denial of ownership against a background of considerable affluence. Pope 
John XXII eventually withdrew the papal sanction of the Franciscan claim not to own 
property in his Quia vir reprobus bull of 1329. It is nevertheless important to note in this 
regard, how William of Ockham sought to justify the Franciscans’ claim that they did not 
own property. The Dominicans accused the Franciscans of heresy, because the claim that 
Jesus and the disciples did not own property suggested that everything they used and 
consumed was used and consumed unlawfully. Ockham argued in response that Jesus and 
the disciples never claimed property rights of the goods they used and consumed under 
positive or earthly law (ius fori). They were never required to do so for no one ever 
contested their right to use and consume these essential goods. As such, they simply 
received the right to consume what they consumed from the law of the heavens (ius 
poli).19 
 
The implication of the Franciscan claim and Ockham’s defence of this claim was 
evidently that the Christian community could already begin to live a heavenly life on 
earth. The Franciscans clearly claimed that Christians could actually live outside the law 
or without law, not only under the law as if not under the law. Especially evident in this 
more radical Christian ethic is a watershed separation of the utopian and the legal, a 
watershed separation that would henceforth inform the markedly less ambiguous 
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conceptions of morality and ethics evident in especially Marxist philosophies of history. 
The central line in these Marxist philosophies would denounce property and the laws of 
the state that sustain property as functions of the phase of history characterised by class 
struggle. The classic line of Marxist thinking would regard property and law as functions 
of an interim fallen state of mankind that would come to the end with the proletarian 
revolution, the dismantling of the state, the dissolution of law and the inauguration of an 
administration of goods for which no law is required.20 It is doubtful whether this Marxist 
vision still envisages any significant role for ambiguity and for Stoic resignation in the 
face of human imperfection in the post-revolutionary, post-historical, and therefore 
futureless “future” of redeemed humanity. Emphasizing such a continued need for Stoic 
resignation in the face of imperfection has nevertheless not been its conspicuous 
trademark. And it is a good question whether recognition of the need for Stoic resignation 
in the face of imperfection would not have blown the whole project with little delay, for it 
would surely have reintroduced recognition of the need for some form of coercive 
regulation of social co-existence that former times (times before the grand proletarian 
revolution) candidly called “law”. 
 
The Hegelian philosophy of history is significantly different from the grand Marxist 
narrative in this regard. For Hegel the ultimate end of history would not deliver us from 
the need for law. For him, the ultimate goal of history was, in fact, the materialisation of 
a legal system based on the idea of individual freedom, not the materialisation of human 
freedom as such. There is enough textual evidence that suggests a significant measure of 
Stoic resignation regarding the gap between the historical materialisation of the idea of 
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freedom and the materialisation of freedom itself in Hegel’s philosophy of history and 
law.21  
 
The great European and Western philosophies of history would appear to have gone out 
of fashion for a considerable while now. One of the significant beacons in this change of 
fashion can surely be found in Jean-Francois Lyotard’s annunciation of the postmodern 
condition of knowledge in terms of the end of the era of grand historical narratives.22 
What happened to utopian thinking in the wake of this postmodern turn? Did it disappear 
along with the grand modern narratives of history? It is in response to this question that 
this essay ventures one of its main theses or hypotheses: To the contrary, the European or 
Western utopian sensibility radicalised in the course of the postmodern turn in the sense 
of returning to roots that the great modern philosophies of history only served to obscure. 
One might say that the great European debate between those in favour and those against 
the institution of private property finally lost its fascination and gave way to a radically 
different understanding and exploration of the utopian sensibility in the Western 
imagination. In the process, an articulation of the utopian intuition came to the fore that 
was no longer content simply to denounce the institution of private property, but shifted 
its focus to a more radical resistance, namely, the resistance to the very notions of 
propriety and the proper that ultimately not only informed and conditioned the institution 
of private property, but also the rather typical and topical denunciations of property as 
unnatural and improper that have been around since Pythagoras and Plato and include 
among its legendary subscribers St. Francis, Erasmus, Rousseau and Marx. It is not 
entirely clear whether More actually belongs to this list or whether he articulated, instead, 
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significant incredulity regarding the insight into the impropriety of private property that 
ensued from utopian conceptions of true human nature.23 Suffice it to say that More’s 
Utopia provides one with a typical and topical articulation of the link between proper 
human nature and the impropriety of private property in Western utopian thinking, 
irrespective of whether he himself meant to endorse or satirise this link. And suffice it to 
observe further that a different line of thinking would emerge prominently in the second 
half of the twentieth century. This line of thinking would not only analyse private 
property, but all intimations of linguistic and normative propriety in terms of temporarily 
dominant and ultimately contingent outcomes of material power relations. Michel 
Foucault’s inquiry into the constructed nature of the distinction between sanity and 
insanity and his invocation of a madness beyond this distinction as the real abode of 
liberty remains one of the principal beacons in this development. Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
genealogical unmasking of the power relations that inform dominant conceptions of 
norms and normativity was of course a nineteenth century precursor of the postmodern 
turn against the grand narrative sustenance of propriety.24 But let us stay with Foucault 
for a crucial statement regarding the literary and artistic turn to (an into) a madness 
beyond constructions of sanity and insanity, for one notices in this statement Foucault’s 
lucid regard for this madness as a return to the beginnings of time and the primal 
emergence of worlds to which we turn in Section III below: 
 
“It is indeed a question of that Sleep of Reason which Goya, in 1797, had already made the first image of 
the “universal idiom”; it is a question of a night which is doubtless that of classical unreason, that triple 
night into which Orestes sank. But in that night, man communicates with what is deepest in himself, and 
with what is most solitary.”25  
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“The madness of Nietzsche, the madness of Van Gogh or of Artaud, belongs to their work perhaps neither 
more nor less profoundly, but in quite another way. The frequency in the modern world of works of art that 
explode out of madness no doubt proves nothing about the reason of that world, about the meaning of such 
works, or even about the relations formed and broken between the real world and the artists who produced 
such works. And yet this frequency must be taken seriously, as if it were the insistence of a question: from 
the time of Hölderlin and Nerval, the numbers of writers, painters, and musicians who have “succumbed” 
to madness has increased; but let us make no mistake here; between madness and the work of art, there has 
been no accommodation, no more constant exchange, no communication of languages .... Artaud’s madness 
does not slip through the fissures of the work of art; his madness is precisely the absence of the work of art, 
the reiterated presence of that absence, its central void experienced and measured in all its endless 
dimensions.... By the madness that interrupts it, a  work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a question 
without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation.... There is no madness except as the final instant 
of the work of art – the work endlessly drives madness to its limits; where there is a work of art, there is no 
madness; and yet madness is contemporary with the work of art, since it inaugurates the time of its truth. 
The moment when, together, the work of art and madness are born and fulfilled is the beginning of the time 
when the world finds itself arraigned by that work of art and responsible before it for what it is.”26 
 
We shall return below (Section IV) to engage more incisively with the key observations 
in this passage. Suffice it to only begin here with a general question: What was at stake in 
the pervasive twentieth century resistance to propriety and the proper and the very notion 
of sanity that underpins propriety and the proper? At stake was not only the resistance to 
the proper and propriety, but the most extreme resistance to the topical and typical that 
condition notions of propriety and the proper, an extreme resistance that borders on 
complete madness and opens up a void, a question without answer, a breach without 
reconciliation. To return to the lines of Celan with which this essay began: At stake was a 
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concern with the u-topos and the absolutely non-typical, the absurd. Ultimately at stake 
was a literary and artistic resistance to any language or idiom that has become current; a 
resistance against the reduction of language to currency, cliché and coinage. As far as 
Marxist or Neo-Marxist versions of this radical resistance against the proper is 
concerned, one might want to refer in this regard, following Jean-Luc Nancy, to literary 
Marxist resistances to the commodification of meaning, that is, to the primary 
commodification of language that underlie whatever secondary modes of 
commodification – economic, moral, etc. – take place in any society. At issue in this 
literary Marxism was or is a shift from typical and topical utopianism to a radical utopian 
concern with the a-typical and non-topical, that is, a shift from clichéd conceptions of 
socialist utopias that simply impute the same basic or natural needs to every individual, to 
an artistic and aesthetic exploration of the absolutely unique and singular manifestation 
and experience of existence. 
 
Marx himself can surely be said to have made a crucial contribution to the opening of this 
literary Marxist register with his acute analysis of law in terms of the commodification, 
not only of labour, but also of the labourer him/herself. A crucial passage from the 1875 
Critique of the Gotha Programme is especially significant in this regard. “Law”, wrote 
Marx in 1875,  
 
“can by its nature only consist in the application of an equal standard, but unequal individuals (and they 
would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) can only be measured by the same standard if 
they are looked at from the same aspect, if they are grasped from one particular side, e.g., if they are 
regarded as workers and nothing else is seen in them, everything else is ignored”.27 
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Adorno would re-articulate this thought 93 years later in Negative Dialectics, one of the 
pivotal texts in what one might call the twentieth century turn from literal to literary 
Marxism. Adorno wrote in 1968: 
 
“Right is the primeval phenomenon of irrational rationality. It makes the principal of formal equivalence 
the only applicable norm. It cuts all sizes over the same last. Such equality, in which differences perish, 
surreptitiously privileges inequality”.28 
 
It is important to note the use of the word “particular” in the English translation of the 
passage from the Critique of the Gotha Programme. “Particular” would have been an apt 
literal translation for the German words “partikuläre” or “besondere”. But the word Marx 
used is “bestimmte”, the literal English translation of which would be “determined”. The 
degree of deviation from literal correspondence in this translation is felicitous, however, 
for it allows one to appreciate the generically determined nature of all particulars. It 
therefore also allows one to discern how ill suited the concern with the particular is as far 
as the radical utopian engagement with the a-typical, non-topical, the absolutely unique 
and absolutely singular is at stake. As Scott Veitch points out poignantly in his 
contribution to a highly instructive volume of essays on this thematic, the particular is 
always already a constructed or determined universal.29 Jean-Luc Nancy’s exploration of 
a Literary Marxism similarly points out the array of surreptitious comparisons that always 
already inform invocations of the particular; hence his recourse to the word “singular” 
instead of “particular” for purposes of naming the key concern of the literary Marxist 
project.30   
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It is therefore important to note in this regard that Marx’s concern in the passage quoted 
above is not with the particular. At issue for him is a critique of the particular; a critique 
of the particular ways in which the law determines general categories of comparison. The 
passage reflects an acute awareness of the determined or generated and ultimate generic 
nature of any positive assessment of value and worth, however specified or specific such 
evaluation may strive to be. The roots of commodification can be traced to specification. 
Marx’s and Adorno’s concern in both these passages quoted above must therefore be 
with differences that cannot be specified or assessed positively. They are concerned, in 
other words, with difference that manifests as difference and nothing else. To come back 
to the central theme of this essay, the radical utopian concern with the a-typical, non-
topical, the unique and the singular is thus a concern with difference that manifests itself 
as difference and nothing else. It is a concern with absolute non-identity, as Adorno put 
it.31 This of course implies that the radical utopian concern that has been announced so 
boldly here cannot be articulated positively. The radical utopian concern cannot be 
constative. Concerned as it is with difference that manifests itself as difference and 
nothing but difference, the radical utopian project can only allude to an elusive otherness 
that withdraws incessantly from all positively specified language. This is why the radical 
utopian project cannot be anything but a literary project that presents whatever it seeks to 
present (the word representation is deliberately avoided here) in an evocative form of 
non-contestation and non-predication. The radical utopian project must present itself as 
evocative and effective fiction that elicits an experience of difference and otherness 
without inviting comparison and without raising claims to comparable truths. 
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Difference that manifests as difference and nothing but incomparable difference is 
evidently what Italo Calvino is getting at in his enigmatic novel If on a winter’s night a 
traveller. A crucial passage from the novel reads as follows: 
 
“The book I would like to read now is a novel in which you sense the story arriving like still-vague thunder, 
the historical story along with the individual’s story, a novel that gives the sense of living through an 
upheaval that still has no name, has not yet taken shape….”32 
 
This passage calls for extensive commentary and we will return to pay more attention to 
it in Section IV below. Suffice it for now to only note well the notion of “an upheaval 
that has no name [and] has not taken shape” invoked in the last line. The cue that this 
invocation gives one is this: The literary utopian quest for the unnameable ends in a 
concern with nothing but a nameless and shapeless disruption of regular and predictable 
courses and patterns of existence that are well-known and well-named. If there is 
anything that is truly nameless and truly absurd, it is surely an upheaval or event that 
disrupts what we regularly know about and expect from the regular courses of existence. 
And if there is anything like a real event that is truly an upheaval with the disruptive 
force that merits being called an upheaval, it surely must remain absolutely nameless. Let 
us take a closer look at what is at issue when we invoke notions such as upheavals and 
events.   
 
III. THE EVENT, THE COMMON POINT OF DEPARTURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT 
AND UTOPIAN IMAGINATIONS 
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We have it from physicists that the physical universe derives from something like a big 
bang.33 Lack of expertise in this field of knowledge prohibits any closer engagement with 
this idea in what follows. Suffice it for now simply to point out some resonance between 
this natural scientific explanation of the origin of all things and the understanding of the 
origin or emergence of worlds in the tradition of philosophical thinking that Edmund 
Husserl called into social scientific currency with the philosophical method which he 
called phenomenology. One need not engage here with the structural mutations in the 
course of which Husserl’s philosophical method transformed into a specific mode of 
philosophical thinking in the work of a number of key philosophers of the twentieth 
century, among the most prominent of whom are Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy. The engagement with the 
event of the world is a prominent concern in the thinking of all these philosophers and the 
exposition of the event that figures as the common point of departure of the utopian and 
the legal in this paper draws deeply from the work of all these thinkers. No attempt will 
be made here to illuminate significant critical differences between them. At issue in what 
follows will simply be a thought that can be drawn from the work of all of them, namely, 
the suggestion that the human world does not just exist as a mode of a-temporal presence. 
The human world emerges from and as an event. Or, to put it more precisely and to 
register the irreducible plurality that is at play here: Human worlds emerge from and as 
events. They happen. They arrive. They do not simply exist in the a-temporal or 
significantly less temporal modes of presence that lay or everyday experience might 
attribute to sticks and stones and other inorganic entities, as if these objects might also 
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exist “beyond” or “outside” the human world (the grand epistemological puzzle of former 
times that current epistemology no longer considers meaningful).34 
 
What is the event? How does a world happen? How does it emerge from that which one 
may decide to call nothingness for lack of any word that would reach effectively into the 
abyssal linguistic void at issue here?  Considering the way the event traverses a boundary 
that human comprehension and perception cannot cross, the event must be taken to 
comprise at least two basic components to which one can refer as the knowable and the 
unknowable or the known and the unknown. The event can accordingly be described as 
the very occurrence of the known and the unknown. The event produces an interface 
between knowledge and utter ignorance. It also produces a register of this interface. It 
brings forth renewed constellations of mute incomprehension and articulate 
understanding. The event is the differential hinge between the sheer potential of new 
registers and new constellations of knowledge/ignorance and 
comprehension/incomprehension that constitute human worlds. The event is also the very 
emergence of these registers and constellations. Utter ignorance and mute 
incomprehension are phrases that one may plausibly use to invoke the abyssal boundary 
of the event, the abyssal limit that emerges from the event or from which the event 
emerges. It is this abyssal boundary that Lyotard invokes when he suggests that no living 
person, not even survivors of the camps, really knows or knew fully what the holocaust 
was.35 It is this same abyssal limit that Derrida invoked when he said that we shall never 
comprehend the meaning of 9/11.36 The event, or the aspect of the event that produces 
knowledge and language, concerns a finite sip from infinite shorelines.37 What 
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subsequently comes to be called “knowledge” retains, at best, an accurate after taste, or 
rather, an after taste the accuracy of which has not turned stale. 
 
IV. THE UTOPIAN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT 
 
We can now return to the three articulations of the utopian imagination invoked above, 
namely Foucault’s madness beyond insanity, Calvino’s nameless and shapeless upheaval, 
and Celan’s absurd poetry. For now that we have some idea of what is at issue when 
phenomenology invokes the notion of an or the event, we can also begin to fathom the 
transgression or transcendence of linguistic propriety that is at stake in the madness, 
absurdity and upheaval that Foucault, Calvino and Celan contemplate. 
 
“By the madness that interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a 
question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is 
forced to question itself”, writes Foucault in the passage quoted above.38 “There is no 
madness except as the final instant of the work of art – the work endlessly drives madness 
to its limits”, he continues. “[M]adness is contemporary with the work of art, since it 
inaugurates the time of its truth. The moment when, together, the work of art and 
madness are born and fulfilled is the beginning of time when the world finds itself 
arraigned by that work or art….”39  
 
Times begin and worlds commence to take shape  in the intimate and close partnership 
between madness and art, suggests Foucault. “The world finds itself arraigned by and 
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responsible before” this partnership. And yet, art is not madness and madness not art. Art 
and madness are only contemporaries, contemporaries that accompany one another in that 
moment (that triple night into which Orestes sank [and still sinks]) when temporality 
commences, when time begins. But they are not the same, there is already a parting 
between them. “Artaud’s madness does not slip through the fissures of the work of art; 
his madness is precisely the absence of the work of art…. where there is a work of art, 
there is no madness”40 Art is already sane and worldly enough (reasonable 
enough/presentable enough in public spaces) to be part of the world that is responsible 
before the partnership between art and madness. Art is already the world’s response to 
madness. It is itself part of the world’s “responsibility before” its partnership with 
madness. It straddles madness and the world that emerges from madness. Art is thus both 
arranged (part of the world that arranges it, notwithstanding the way it arraigns the world) 
and deranged (irreducibly in partnership with madness). 
 
The poem, suggests Celan, likewise straddles meaningful language and an absurdity that 
is devoid of meaning. Celan tells us that the poem is the place – der Ort – where literary 
modes of language (tropes and metaphors – Tropen  und Metaphern) want to be taken 
into the absurd. Alongside this first invocation of place as Ort he almost immediately 
introduces another word that signifies “place”, namely topos. He introduces topos in 
conjunction with research or -forschung. At issue is for him, then, is the research of place 
- Toposforschung. But the sense of the place that is at issue in this research of place 
understood as topos is evidently different from the sense of place that is denoted by the 
word Ort. The latter “place” invokes a locality, a spatial abode. At issue for him in the 
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research of place as topos is evidently a place in language, a linguistic place, in other 
words. European languages have been denoting this linguistic place, at least since 
Aristotle, with the word topic. A topic is a focus point of a discussion, conversation or 
text. It is also a typical focus point of a discussion. A topic is thus through and through a 
typical place in language and more specifically the form or mode in which this typical 
place takes place in language. Celan links topos or topic directly to tropes and metaphors. 
At issue for him are the modes and metaphors, that is, the ways in which language 
produces topics.  
 
However, Celan is only concerned with tropes and metaphors and the ways of language 
in the light of that which is to be researched, namely, the non-place, the U-topie. The last 
line of the prelude starts in the form of an elliptic question: “Toposforschung?” The 
question at issue here is evidently this one: Is the poem the research of topos or topic[s]? 
Or, in view of the elaboration with which we have begun here: Is the poem or poetry the 
research of a typical place in language? Indeed/Gewiß, answers Celan, but only in the 
light of the non-place – aber im Lichte der U-topie – where the typical topics and typical 
tropes of language want to become completely untypical and non-topical. At issue for 
him in the abode of the poem is the non-place where language wants to become absurd – 
wo alle Tropen und Metaphern ad absurdum geführt werden wollen. Celan’s concern 
with the poem is clearly the concern with language that turns around and away from its 
identity forming typicality and topicality. It is time to turn around – Es ist Zeit, 
umzukehren – stresses a line that follows almost directly after the ones quoted above. 
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The about turn that the poem effects is nevertheless never complete. The poetic quest for 
the absurd that would turn completely away from language, from typical enough tropes 
and metaphors, would become unreadable. It would cease to be poetry. Celan is duly of 
aware of this. The poem that would reach the absurd that it sets out to reach – the 
complete or absolute poem – does not exist.41 The poem that exists, the readable poem, is 
ultimately a failed attempt at straddling utopian absurdity and typical and topical 
language. In the language of Foucault invoked above: The poem is ultimately too much 
part of the world to sink completely into the madness of Artaud and the triple night of 
Orestes. The readable poem, however couched in a distant and strange self-designed 
darkness42 is still too intelligible to embody the very idiocy of Goya’s Idiot. It cannot 
become this “shrieking and twisting” convulsion that, according to Foucault, “promises 
the birth of the first man and his first movement toward liberty.”43 
 
One will never name it, but one might be edging here – via Foucault and Celan – towards 
a sense of what might be at stake in Calvino’s invocation of “an upheaval that still has no 
name” in If on a winter’s night a traveller. Calvino himself stresses that the novel that he 
contemplates does not name anything. It only “gives the sense of living through an 
upheaval that still has no name”, that is, of living through something that cannot be 
named. It is important to reflect carefully on this giving of a sense that does not name, for 
not only is the straddling of language and absurdity – in Celan – and language and 
madness – in Foucault – again  at stake here. It is also at stake in a way that throws more 
light on the enigmatic boundary that is crossed and not crossed in this straddling. One 
must begin by noting the tautological character of the whole phrase “give a sense of 
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living through”. “Sensing” is the essence of “living through.” “Living through” is first 
and foremost a matter of sensing. Giving a sense or giving sense therefore already 
facilitates or constitutes an instance of “living through”. At issue in the novel or in the 
response to the novel is therefore not an imagination of living through something. At 
issue is not an “as if” we are living through some event. The novel gives the sense. It 
gives, affords and facilitates nothing less than an actual living through. The novel allows 
for living through an event. As such, it does not concern the mere imagination of an 
event. It does not concern or entail an “as if” experience. As far as any as if experience is 
at all relevant here, it is the negation or the inversion of the as if that is really at stake in 
the novel. The real sense or experience of the novel is, in fact, an as if not experience. 
Reading entails vivid and visceral experience, as vivid and visceral as any other bodily 
experience; as vivid and visceral, perhaps, as a nosebleed. Sometimes it might take 
nothing less than a nosebleed to disrupt the experience of reading. Engaged reading 
produces the momentary sense of no longer being tied by the language to which reading 
is irreducibly tied. The actual experience of reading is therefore a matter living under (the 
law of) language as if not living under language. 
 
The objection that the opposite is true, the objection that reading is an imagined 
experience and therefore an as if experience and not an as if not experience, contemplates 
a disembodied imagination from the perspective of which the very real existential 
threshold- or boundary-crossing experience of reading and the profound utopian role that 
this experience plays in human existence cannot be appreciated. The utopian and 
redeeming force of reading literature that Agamben attributes to literature in The Time 
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that Remains44 is incomplete but real.45 Literature produces par excellence the as if not or 
ὡς μὴ experience of messianic time, the experience of living under the law as if not living 
under the law. Reading is the redemption that takes place in the midst of and under law, 
the redemption that renders the experience of law unreal. What law? In the case of 
literature it is the general laws of language and linguistic reference that are concerned. It 
is the liberation from these laws that opens up a utopian or u-topical space that delivers 
the reader from the constraints of typical and topical language. 
 
This redeeming utopian experience nevertheless remains incomplete. The sense of an 
upheaval that has no name and cannot be named, produced or induced by reading, 
remains irreducibly clouded in mystery. It is always inaccurate or untrue in a fundamental 
sense. Literature, suggests another passage from If on a winter’s night a traveller, is 
irreducibly apocryphal in the double sense of the word. Not only is true literature “false” 
or falsifying. It is false and falsifying because it derives from a mystery that cannot be 
revealed. Calvino writes:  
 
“Apocrypha (from the Greek apokryphos, hidden, secret): (1) originally referring to the “secret books” of 
religious sects; later to texts not recognized as canonical in those religions which have established a canon 
of revealed writings; referring to texts falsely attributed to a period or to an author….Perhaps my true 
vocation was that of an author of apocrypha, in the several meanings of the term: because writing always 
means hiding something in such a way that it then is discovered; because the truth that can come from my 
pen is like a shard that has been chipped from a great boulder by a violent impact, then flung far away; 
because there is no certitude outside falsification.”46 
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The work of art does not embody madness, wrote Foucault with reference to Artaud. The 
truly absurd poem does not exist, insisted Celan. The novel derives from the secret, but 
falsifies it, suggests Calvino here. But the falsification at issue here is crucial for the 
utopian experience. The secret does not have an independent existence that then becomes 
falsified by language so as to only leave the reader with a sense of mystery. No, it is the 
other way round. The falsification wrought by language produces the mystery. The secret 
has no place of its own. It is not a place. It is the non-place, the u-topos. The irreducible 
falsification effected in language and art calls forth the u-topos, the split and threshold 
between Artaud’s madness and the work of art, the poem and the absurd, the novel and its 
apocryphal origins.  
 
We commenced with the proposition that the event is the common point of departure of 
both legal and utopian discourses. These discourses take leave of one another, we 
contended, because of the way they respond to the event in radically different and in fact 
in directly opposite ways. The utopian and the legal take leave of one another because of 
the fundamentally opposite or inverse trajectories of their respective responses to the 
event. It should now have become clear that utopian discourses concern an origin-
oriented concern with the very event from which they emerge. As such, they entail much 
more than mere attempts to step away from privatisation and private property, as the 
classical history of utopian discourses would suggest. The radical utopian discourses of 
the twentieth century make clear that they seek to step back from the very notions of 
propriety and the proper that inform and condition discourses of private property in the 
first place. They do so in the hope of sustaining an experience with the absolute 
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singularity and ineffability of the event. The absurd, Celan calls it. Madness is Foucault’s 
word for it. Calvino calls it an upheaval with no name. An upheaval with no name is an 
apt denotation for the ineffable event or the ineffability of the event that precipitates the 
beginnings of time and the origin of worlds. 
 
The trajectory of literature, that is, the radical utopian trajectory of literature, consists in 
an incessant return to the nameless event from which this trajectory itself emerges like a 
shard flung forth from a violent impact. Literature is the incessant obsession to return to 
the event from which it derives. It is the utopian obsession to return to the event that 
flung it into language but to which it cannot return fully without losing its status as 
language completely. As Celan explains with reference to Buchner’s Lenz, it simply 
seeks to return to or recall a date – Lenz’s journey through the mountains – that it cannot 
recall from the inside of language from where it is doomed to commence.47 That is why 
serious poetry and serious literature always put their linguistic status – their status as 
language – at risk. Not being able to return fully, however, literature ultimately remains 
the obsession to maintain sufficient proximity to the event. It is the obsession to maintain 
at least such proximity to the event as would still allow for the real sense of living 
through, living or reliving the event. This is where significantly a-typical and non-topical 
u-topian sensibilities have arrived today. This is the trajectory of its response to the event. 
The time has come now to look at the very different trajectory of the law’s response to 
the event. 
 
V. LAW’S RESPONSE TO THE EVENT 
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If it is correct to say that the trajectory of law’s response to the event is the exact inverse 
(180̊ ) of the trajectory of the utopian and literary response to the event, and if it is also 
correct to say that literature shares with the experience of messianic time the experience 
of living under the law (living under the law of language, in the case of literature) as if 
not under the law, the following statement should offer an accurate assessment of the 
law’s response to the event: Law responds to the event by acting as if it is law. Law’s 
response to the event is not really or is surely not fully an instance of law. It is much 
rather a matter of staging itself or styling itself as law. The question whether all of this is 
correct or not need not be addressed directly in what follows. Suffice it simply to say for 
now that the assessment of law that has just been offered here is exactly the assessment of 
law’s status that one finds in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law. According to Kelsen, law 
never quite exists. The existence of law cannot be posited or asserted (gesetzt). The 
existence of law must be presupposed (vorausgesetzt). One must deal and work with the 
law as if  (als ob) it exists. 48 And this is so, argues Kelsen, exactly because of the way 
the law is, in the final analysis, always a response to an event. 
 
Why does Kelsen argue in this way? He argues thus because of the problematic and 
ambivalent status of the foundational norm or Grundnorm in his pure theory of law. The 
pure theory of law requires that every legal norm in the hierarchical system or pyramid of 
the law be fully validated by a higher norm. This would appear to be reasonably feasible 
in a legal system where one apparently already has legal norms in place that can and must 
be invoked as validation for all other legal norms lower down in the system of law. The 
 35 
problem is, however, that the foundational norm or Grundnorm at the apex of the legal 
system that is required to validate the rest of the legal system, itself lacks a higher norm 
that could validate it. The foundational norm thus remains fundamentally unvalid or un-
validated (as opposed to invalid and invalidated). And if the foundational norm remains 
unvalid, the whole system of law supposedly validated by the foundational norm also 
remains fundamentally unvalid. Not only can a pure theory of law thus not assert the 
validity of the foundational norm. A pure theory of law cannot assert the validity of any 
legal norm. A pure theory of law must therefore rely on a whole series of presuppositions 
through which the law is held to be law. The pure theory of law deals with non-law and 
works with non-law as if it is law. 
 
In what sense can and must one say that all of this is the inevitable consequence of the 
law’s response to the event? One can and must say this because of the way real or 
empirical legal norms are always a response to some or other urgent historical exigency. 
This is true of national constitutions (or trans-national conventions or treaties) – the 
empirical or impure instantiation of what should have been a pure foundational norm – 
and all other legal rules that are based on such national constitutions or trans-national 
conventions. National constitutions or transnational conventions assess and respond to a 
historical situation that calls or at least appears to call for the inauguration of a new 
jurisdiction and the installation of a new legal system. What happens in this historical 
moment of assessment and response can obviously not qualify, ab-initio, as valid. The 
assessments and responses that take place here eventually receive validation in the course 
of an extended process of non-legal intervention and/or lack of intervention. The validity 
 36 
that eventually emerges from a function of a mixture of historical and sociological 
commitment, contentedness, acquiescence and adequate familiarity that usually goes by 
the name of “legitimacy”. 
 
Compared to validity, legitimacy is a vague and diffuse notion. It is therefore also a 
highly contentious notion. Legitimacy can therefore not be invoked under circumstances 
where some or other crisis or conflict demands recourse to the constitution or convention 
as an instance of law that everyone can be expected to abide, for the contentiousness of 
the situation will most certainly spill into, contaminate and inundate whatever 
“legitimacy” may have existed or may have appeared to exist before and up to the 
moment of crisis. Every instance of significant crisis would therefore reopen the initial 
assessment of and response to the historical exigency that the constitution or convention 
was supposed to have settled. The enduring existence of constitutions and constitutional 
law surely depends on sufficient degrees of legitimacy (contentedness, acquiescence, 
familiarity) as Hart points out well with the assertion that the effective survival of legal 
systems depend on sufficient levels of internal aspect.49 But it should also be clear that 
no constitution would constitute law and found law if such constitution and foundation of 
law were to depend on legitimacy. Legitimacy (sufficient commitment, contentedness, 
acquiescence, familiarity) is exactly what is in question or in crisis when we seek 
recourse to law. Legitimacy can therefore not be invoked as an answer to legal questions 
for law is exactly that to which we turn, not to answer or resolve questions of legitimacy, 
but to terminate them. We terminate a question of legitimacy by supposing or 
presupposing that we have law that terminates the question. 
 37 
 
This is the crucial move of Kelsen’s pure theory of law. The pure theory of law turns on 
the presupposition of valid law and legal validity that never exists in or as fact. Factually 
or empirically speaking, “law” or what was or is supposed to be “law” will always run 
the risk of disintegrating and evaporating in the face of legitimacy questions. Law only 
exists as long as adequate numbers of sufficiently powerful individuals continue to 
presuppose the prior,  a-priori and therefore precedent existence of law (which of course 
would historically only happen – this is Hart’s point – as long as adequate levels of 
legitimacy or adequate levels of internal aspect prevail). The pure theory of law 
considers law to pivot on the act of purification that takes place when questions of 
legitimacy are terminated or substituted by presuppositions of validity. This act of 
purification is the sacrificial heart of law. The ancient rites of sacrifice were essentially 
rites of purification and law will never sever its definitional ties with these rites.50 
 
What happens at the level of constitutional law also happens at every lower level of law 
that depends on the constitution. Constitutional questions may sometimes appear to be 
settled. A legal dispute may appear only to involve the contentiousness of some or other 
lower level rule of law, say some rule of private law. The identification of a valid and 
applicable private law rule again turns invariably on a sacrificial act of purification that 
settles the dust and impurity of some social ambiguity. There would have been no dispute 
or conflict had there not been ambiguity. Ambiguity is the essential impurity that law has 
to terminate. The sacrificial termination of ambiguity is the essential purification that 
produces pure law. The impurity of social ambiguities that informs private law disputes 
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had better be dealt with adequately at the level of private law adjudication, for this 
impurity surely harbours the potential of contaminating the whole system of law right up 
or into its constitutional roots. The need to do so has never been addressed adequately in 
the pervasive literature on the so-called horizontal application of constitutional rights. 
 
The event – a date; an occurrence; a sudden irruption of discontent; the irruption of 
ambiguity that conditions discontent – is the essential impurity to which the sacrificial 
purification of the law responds. It should already be clear that the trajectory of this 
purification is one of distancing. Law distances itself from the event. It takes leave of the 
event. Its trajectory is exactly the opposite of the literary utopian or radical utopian 
response to the event. Law and radical utopian literature constitute two opposite 
responses to the event. As such, they relate to one another by taking leave of one another. 
They only begin to relate to one another when they begin to take leave of one another. 
Those who would wish to propose a different, closer, overlapping, mutually informative 
or wrist-locked relation between law and utopian literature should first try to imagine the 
dark eye of an ancient and eternal hurricane, the u-topos, the pure impurity of the event, 
the nothingness in which all is still one and nothing relates to nothing.  
 
VI. STOIC DIFFERENCE AND INDIFFERENCE – SOME CONCLUDING 
THOUGHTS 
 
Martha Nussbaum’s work Upheavals of Thought presents her understanding of emotions 
as upheavals of thought as a neo-Stoic position.51 She takes from the Stoics the 
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conviction that emotions are evaluative cognitive appraisals. But in doing so she also 
takes leave of two fundamental tenets of Stoicism. The first concerns the conception that 
the cognitive content of emotions is invariably misleading. The second concerns the 
ethics of emotional indifference that the Stoics developed on the basis of their general 
distrust of emotions. She rejects both these positions and seeks to develop instead a more 
nuanced view that recognises the way emotions can lead moral judgment astray, but also 
realises that they remain indispensable for sound moral judgment.52  We are moving to 
the end of this essay and the short engagement with her formidable argument that follows 
cannot does not do justice to it. However, it is instructive to briefly compare the key 
arguments in Upheavals of Thought with the assessment of the relation between law and 
the utopian imagination that has been articulated in this essay.  
 
In contrast to the Stoic denunciation of the distorting role of emotions in moral 
deliberation, Nussbaum seeks to rehabilitate emotions as an instructive source of moral 
deliberation. According to her, emotions provide sound moral deliberation with an 
essential relation to reality without which moral judgment would not the even become the 
existential issue that it is for humans. Emotional responses provide moral deliberation 
with an indispensible aboutness. They render moral deliberation reality- or object- 
related.53 They are the upheavals that call forth moral deliberation. In this regard her 
thoughts would seem to resonate strongly with the engagement in this essay with 
Calvino’s invocation of an upheaval with no name or shape. However, Nussbaum’s 
concern is surely not with the literary utopian return to this nameless and shapeless 
upheaval. The trajectory of her thinking in Upheavals of Thought is evidently the 
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trajectory of law, the trajectory through which the law distances itself from upheavals or 
events. Her concern is not precisely with legal judgment but with moral judgement, but 
the crucial thrust of moral and legal judgment is the same as far as their respective 
relations with the utopian imagination are concerned. At issue in both is the articulation 
of sound acts of generalisable judgment (at which all reasonable people should eventually 
arrive) with recourse to which one can extract and distance oneself from the immediate 
chaos of the event. 
 
Forceful emotions enter the hurricanes with which worlds begin and end and they draw 
us into their obliterating chaos. Only when they subside do we find ourselves able and 
necessitated to withdraw from the event and re-establish degrees of equilibrium by means 
of sound moral and legal judgement. Utopian literature resists this withdrawal and seeks 
to re-enter the event. It continues to live through and in the upheaval or seriously attempts 
to do so. It pivots on a relentless and obsessive aboutness. One might diagnose it 
psychoanalytically as a serious case of melancholy, if not hysteria.54 Law prudently 
departs from the aboutness of the event. Law is not about the event. It relates to the event 
by leaving it behind. Whether it does this with some regret depends on the extent to 
which it consciously recognises that it does so, as Kelsen’s pure theory of law does. 
 
Nussbaum’s assessment of the relation between law and literature is quite in line with the 
trajectory of her thought in Upheavals of Thought. According to her, good literature can 
contribute to good legal judgment. It is a source of sound legal insight. It moves in the 
same direction in which the law moves. Her views in this regard are not implausible. 
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There may well be a genre of “literature” that is simply aimed at moral enlightenment 
and legal instruction. Such “literature” would indeed move on parallel lines and in the 
same hermeneutic direction that law moves. But this kind of “literature” would surely not 
be helpful as far as the attempt to understand the relation between law and the utopian 
imagination is concerned.55 It would not be concerned with the shapeless and nameless 
aboutness that Celan discerns in Lenz’s journey through the mountain. It would be 
concerned with re-establishing desired degrees of stability and equilibrium in the wake of 
the devastation that results from this shapeless and nameless aboutness, not with this 
aboutness as such. In this respect, Nussbaum’s engagement with the relation between law 
and literature is surely not utopian.56 
 
Be it as it may, a reassessment of the legacy of the Stoics indeed appears 
uncircumventable for any thorough engagement with the relation between law and 
utopian thought. The thoughts that have been developed in this essay nevertheless call for 
a reassessment of Stoics ethics that differs significantly from the one on which Nussbaum 
embarks in Upheavals of Thought. It calls, in fact, for the question whether the concept of 
Stoic indifference was not in fact informed or at least accompanied by a radically 
differentiated ethics that one may plausibly call Stoic difference.  
  
The massive hermeneutic weight and textual evidence that inform the concept of Stoic 
indifference is undeniable. At issue in this concept is the common reading and conception 
of Stoic ethics that has prevailed for millennia, namely, the conception that Stoic ethics 
turn on the ability to remain calm in the face of the painful imperfections of this world. 
 42 
Stoics reconcile themselves with the world and with fate.57 In this respect they are 
fundamentally non-utopian. This assessment of Stoicism is accurate, but it fails to do 
justice to its complex legacy. We already noted the ambiguity of the Stoic mind-set 
above. We noted the Stoic conception of and faith in universal reason that informs Stoic 
visions of natural law. But we also noted that the Stoics entertained no illusions regarding 
the actual materialisation of this universal reason. From this perspective, at least, it seems 
wrong to impute indifference to them. Indifference may well be imputed to the Cynics, a 
school of philosophy closely related but significantly different from Stoicism, but not to 
the Stoics themselves. Considered carefully, the Stoic regard for universal reason and 
natural law, on the one hand, and human imperfection, on the other, may well justify an 
understanding of Stoic philosophy in terms of an acute regard for the fundamental 
tensions, differences and differentiations that condition human existence. It is instructive 
to highlight two of them: 
 
1) Human existence is conditioned by faith in universal principles of reason, on the one 
hand, and a pervasive failure to comply with them or to articulate them consistently, on 
the other. 
 
2) Human existence is conditioned by profound yearnings for existential fulfilment, on 




These two tensions may well be counter sides of the same coin. Quests for existential 
fulfilment may well be the root cause of disastrous and destructive failures of reason. 
Attempts to maintain or restore compliance with principles of reason may well stem from 
wariness regarding the catastrophes to which quests for existential fulfilment may lead. 
Should there be any substance to the way the relation between law and utopian 
aspirations has been articulated in this essay, it may well be because law and utopian 
aspirations represent the quintessential trajectories along which compliance with 
principles of reason and quests for existential fulfilment take leave of one another. John 
Rawls’ distinction between public reason and comprehensive world views and his 
articulation of the tensions between them may well be one of the most incisive 
articulations of this insight in contemporary political and legal theory. Rawls is acutely 
aware of the way compliance with principles of public reason frustrate deeper or fuller 
existential quests. He writes: 
 
“As institutions and laws are always imperfect, we may view that form of discourse as imperfect and in any 
case as falling short of the whole truth set out by our comprehensive doctrine. Also, that discourse can 
seem shallow because it does not set out the most basic grounds on which we believe our view rests.”58 
 
Must one conclude with Rawls that law, in comparison to utopian aspirations or 
comprehensive worldviews,59 is existentially shallow? Not necessarily. Rawls, in any 
case, does not suggest that law is shallow. It only seems shallow, he writes. Considering 
the remarkable existential achievement that becomes evident when relatively faithful 
compliance with law and relatively effective sustenance of legal systems manage to steer 
clear of the disastrous abyssal nothingness or u-topos to which utopian quests incline, law 
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can hardly be deemed shallow. Law is existentially conditioned and marked by the 
abyssal depths from which it manages to steer clear. A regard for the vertiginous cliffs 
from which the law has managed to step back is enough to make one realise that the law 
is far from shallow. Its apparent shallowness is, in fact, an inverse depth. It moves along 
the same trajectory of profound utopian quests and aspirations, but does so in the 
opposite direction. The more profound the utopian aspirations become with which law 
has to contend and compete in the wake of abyssal events, the more profound becomes 
the law’s inverse depth. 
 
The relation of law to the literary radicalisation of utopian sensibilities that this essay 
articulates should be understood in the same way. The more the generalising language of 
law and general legal concepts can retain a memory of the way they take leave of the 
radical literary concern with the abyssal mystery of existence and the non-generalisable 
singularity of the event, the more will their unique achievements – their inversely 
singular achievements – become evident. Law need and must therefore not be informed 
by utopian literature. It must be informed and remain informed about the way its own 
trajectory relates to the historical events from which it too is flung into existence. And a 
regard for this trajectory demands or consists in an acute awareness of how the law 
differs from and takes leave of utopian literature. 
 
The twentieth century radicalisation of the utopian discourse that required or precipitated 
its turn into a literary discourse, that is, into a suggestive, experimental and ultimately 
sublimely poetic discourse (as opposed to typical predicative or propositional discourses 
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about ideal social arrangements) can be understood as a response to the disastrous 
totalitarian political projects of the twentieth century that resulted from propositional, 
predicative or literal utopian discourses.60 Whether this response has turned utopian 
thinking into a private concern with no political and therefore no legal significance, and 
whether there might not be some indirect feedback loops between the opposite 
trajectories of utopian literature and law, feedback loops that may indeed lead back to the 
realm of politics, is a different question that one must reserve for another inquiry.61 One 
must also reserve here for another inquiry the question whether the twentieth century 
transformation of the utopian imagination described in this essay – its radical turn away 
from the resistance to private property and towards a more fundamental resistance to 
linguistic and normative propriety – has not in fact contributed to a global entrenchment 
of existing property relations in the course of the twentieth century. Suffice it to conclude 
for now that the literary utopian turn surely effected a certain de-politicisation of utopian 
thinking. But suffice it also to suggest for now that this de-politicisation of utopian 
thinking may well have been a response to a political exigency, a response through which 
politics, at least in some parts of the world, became liberal politics by ridding itself of 
destructive obsessions with ultimate origins and ends. Cast in the terminology of physics 
and the scientific discourse about the primal event that flung the universe into existence, 
the literary utopian turn may well have been a felicitous development that temporarily 
and precariously stabilised the irreducible exposure of matter to anti-matter and rendered 
possible, for a further while at least, the option of muddling through on this careening 
mud ball called earth.62     
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Does the description of the constellation of law, utopia, event and the two trajectories on 
which this constellation pivots ultimately turn on little more than a Stoic endorsement of 
liberal politics? The invocation of Rawls’ thoughts on the relation between public reason 
and comprehensive worldviews in the previous section surely seems to suggest so. One 
cannot address the question here whether this same constellation might not also account 
for the essential tensions that are bound to inform political and legal dispensations that 
are definitively non-liberal. My suspicion is that it does indeed. My suspicion is that any 
non-liberal political dispensation, say any fundamentally Marxist or communitarian 
political dispensation, would only be able to stabilise itself institutionally to the extent 
that its literal utopian imaginations can be displaced by literary utopian imaginations. 
 
Be it as it may, if it is a liberal politics that happens to be endorsed and stabilised by the 
law, utopia, event constellation elaborated in this essay, it is surely a ruefully respectful 
liberalism that is at stake here, a liberalism that recognises profoundly the extent to which 
it suppresses and takes leave of the primordial aboutness that catapults it into existence. 
Political liberalism generally aims to be a level headed and dispassionate affair. Hysteria 
is not its way. However, as long as it continues to find the question regarding the relation 
between liberal democratic law and the utopian imagination compelling, liberalism’s 
Stoic prudence will remain tangibly haunted by nagging melancholy. And at times this 
Stoic prudence and nagging melancholy will hardly be distinguishable. This should not 
be surprising. Notwithstanding the two very different and opposite directions of their 
respective trajectories, law and the utopian imagination continue to traverse the same 
contaminated and contaminating space that opens up in the wake of the event.     
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47 Cf. Celan, Der Meridian 201: Und vor einem Jahr, in Errinnerung an eine versäumnte 
Begegnung im Engadin, brachte ich eine kleine Geschichte zu Papier, in der ich einen 
Menschen ‘wie Lenz’ durchs Gebirg gehen ließ. Ich hatte mich, das eine wie der andere 
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Mal, von einem ‘20. Jänner’, hergeschrieben.” Cf. also Derrida, Schibboleth (Paris, 
Galilée, 1986) 11-28. 
48 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1994) 66-67. 
49 Hart, The Concept of Law 88-89. Hart’s “internal aspect” is of course narrower than 
the broad description of legitimacy elaborated above.  
50 René Girard, La Violence et Le Sacré (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1972) 38-40. 
51 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 4: 
“The view that emerges may justly be called neo-Stoic, and I shall often use this term.” 
52 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, especially chapter VII.  
53 Cf. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought 16. 
54 Consider in this regard the connection that Freud observed between literature and 
hysteria. Hysteria, Freud first believed, is a symptomatic return to an early experience 
that in most cases occurred during childhood, whereas the enjoyment of literature 
concerns a non-symptomatic and sublimated equivalent of this return. Cf. Sigmund 
Freud, Der Dichter und das Phantasieren, in Gesammelte Werke (18 vols, Frankfurt a.M: 
Fischer Verlag, 1999) VII, 213-223, especially at 221. It is important to note here Freud’s 
invocation of an experience that mostly belongs to childhood - “ein meist der Kindheit 
angehöriges Erlebnis”. This mostly surely implies a “not only” that allows one to read 
“childhood experiences” broadly so as to include all eventful or life-changing 
experiences that disrupt mature and settled worlds and expose them to the infancy or 
nascence that marks all new beginnings. To the extent that Freud also took leave of the 
seduction theory of hysteria (analyses of many cases moved him to recognise that the 
traumatic event most often never took place in fact) and moved towards a pathoanalytic 
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(instead of a psychogenetic) theory that found the cause of hysteria to inhere in libidinal 
energies that the individual fails to integrate into an equilibrium of mature and settled 
sexuality, one can interpret hysteria as a symptomatic instance of the utopian resistance to 
mature and settled worlds and an obsessive return to the upheaval of awakening or 
unsettled sexuality. Hysterical individuals continue to live in the event or the infantile 
emergence from the event and fail or refuse to arrive in established worlds of mature and 
settled sexualities in which perversities are not repressed, but either do not exist or 
become well accommodated as part of the healthy sexual self. And should one under this 
post-seduction theory of hysteria continue to maintain Freud’s earlier link between 
hysteria and literature, the constellation that emerges is one in which literature is an 
engagement, not with a specific or nameable past event, but with the interminable and 
unnameable upheaval of unsettled sexuality that vaults individuals into existence. 
Unsettled sexuality is of course not the only primordial aboutness that energises the 
human individual, but only one of many strong emotional or libidinal responses that 
beckon individuals away from the established worlds of settled and transparent legal and 
moral normativity and towards unsettled and troubled (pre-worldly) regions of existence. 
But it remains one of the more forceful unsettling energies in human existence; hence 
also its prominence in probing utopian literature. Cf. in this regard Milan Kundera’s 
observations in the interview with Philip Roth published as an afterword to Kundera, The 
Book of Laughter and Forgetting (Penguin Books, 1983) 236-237:  Cf. further the 
illuminating discussion of Freud’s observations regarding hysteria and literature in 
Philippe Van Haute and Tomas Geyskens, A Non-Oedipal Psychoanalysis? (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2012) 11-72 to which this footnote is much indebted.   
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55 Cf. Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy”, in Alan John Simmons et al, eds., Punishment: A 
Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 167, 
172 – 175, 180 – 81. For two previous engagements with Nussbaum on this count, cf. 
Van der Walt, “Law and the Space of Appearance in Arendt’s thought” in M. Goldini and 
C. McCorkindale (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 63-
88; Van der Walt, Agaat’s law: Reflections on Law and Literature with reference to 
Marlene van Niekerk’s novel Agaat, South African Law Journal, 126 (2009): 695-739. 
56 This also explains the way Nussbaum shares Ismene’s assessment of Antigone (“you 
have a warm heart for the cold”). Cf. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 
64-67. For Nussbaum Antigone does not have eros because of her “single minded 
identification with duties to the dead”. But “we admire Antigone, nonetheless, in a way 
that we do not admire Creon”, argues Nussbaum, because there is some complexity and 
conflict in her single mindedness when, before the moment of her death, she recognises 
her loss and compares herself to Niobe (“wasted away by nature’s snow and rain”). In 
other words, it is Antigone’s brief moment of sanity (when she experiences conflict as 
others would) that redeems her for Nussbaum, not her mad obsession with burying 
Polinices. In terms of the radical literary turn in the utopian imagination described in this 
essay, Antigone’s mad obsession with the singularity of her dead brother (she can have 
children again, she can have another husband, but she cannot have another brother – cf. 
Sophocles, Antigone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994) 87 
(905-910) – makes her the archetypal utopian heroine.  
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57 Cf. again fn. 9 above. 
58 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 243. 
59 All comprehensive worldviews are plainly “utopian” in some respects. They are 
patently counter-factual and never correspond with the world as we know it.  
 
60 Cf. in this regard the poignant discussion “Konservative Politik, Arbeit, Sozialismus 
und Utopie heute” between Jürgen Habermas and Hans Ulrich Reck in Jürgen Habermas, 
Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit, (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1985) 73-76. 
61 Such an inquiry could begin with the explorations of the role of literature in the 
formation of human rights cultures that eventually result in the development of law in 
Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (New York: WW Norton, 2008) and Richard Rorty, 
“Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality” in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley 
(eds), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures (New York: Basic Books, 1993).  
Rorty writes: “Like everyone else, I too should prefer a bottom-up way of achieving 
utopia, a quick reversal of fortune which will make the last first. But I do not think this is 
how utopia will in fact come into being …. A better sort of answer is the sort of long, sad, 
sentimental story which begins “Because this is what it is like to be in her situation – to 
be far from home, among strangers…” (I relied on 
http://web1.uct.usm.maine.edu/~bcj/issues/three/rorty.html for this quote and I am 
indebted to discussions with Sibylle van der Walt for this point and these references.) 
That literary accounts of suffering can change social sentiments that lead to positive 
social developments such as the rise of human rights cultures is plausible. It is also 
plausible that the literature that brings about such transformations may have a real 
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utopian thrust before the normative sedimentation sets in that may lead to the 
establishment of positive normative cultures. It is nevertheless important not to confuse 
the subsequent formation of normative cultures such as a human rights culture with 
utopian imaginations, as Rorty appears to be doing here, and as Habermas surely does 
when he refers to the “realistic utopia of human rights”. Cf. Habermas, Zur Verfassung 
Europas – Ein Essay (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 2011) 13 -38. Human rights cultures and 
law may indeed be the result of social upheavals precipitated by literary utopian 
explorations, but they largely serve to settle these upheavals and lay them to rest. It is up 
to significantly probing and experimental literature to sustain these upheavals and to 
resist the generic cultural and legal norms that ultimately curtail and even suppress rather 
than promote the singularity of human dignity, integrity and autonomy that is supposedly 
promised, for instance, by the notion of human rights. The notion of a “realistic utopia” 
(Habermas) makes no good sense, nor does the notion of “utopia … [coming] into being” 
(Rorty), at least not from the perspective of the radical literary understanding of the 
concept of utopia that has been developed in this essay. 
62 For this reference to the discourse of physics on matter and anti-matter I rely on Martin 
Paetsch, “Das Rätsel der zwei mächtigsten Kräfte im All”, GEOkompakt 29 (2011) 74-
81. The metaphor of the “careening mud ball” is pinched from the epigraph in Ted 
Leason, The Habit of Rivers (New York: Lyons and Burford, 1994). 
                                                                                                                                                 
